Steering the Ship of State: Fundamental Rights, State Power and Janus-faced Constitutionalism by O'Cinneide, Colm
 1 
‘Steering the Ship of State: Fundamental Rights, State Power and Janus-faced 
Constitutionalism’ 
 
Colm O’Cinneide 
UCL 
 
WG Hart Workshop 2010: Conceptualisations of the Purposes of Constitutions 
 
VERY MUCH A DRAFT – PLEASE APPROACH WITH GREAT CAUTION 
AND CITE ONLY WITH PERMISSION! 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper makes three arguments.  
 
Firstly, the rights-based constitutionalism that has emerged in the wake of cases such 
as Brown v Board of Education and the „Rights Revolution‟ is formally analogous but 
substantially different to earlier, more „classical forms of negative constitutionalism: 
it can be seen as a mutated form of the earlier template.  
 
Secondly, a key element of the difference between classical negative 
constitutionalism and rights-based constitutionalism (which sits alongside rather than 
fully displacing other forms of constitutionalism in contemporary constitutional 
systems) is the „Janus face‟ that it adopts to state power: it combines elements of 
classical negative constitutionalism with the periodic positive embrace of state power 
where necessary to deliver on its professed ambitions. This means that treating this 
mutated form of constitutionalism as similar to classical negative constitution in 
focusing on limiting state power is likely to be misleading.  
 
Thirdly, this form of constitutionalism aims towards the achievement of a „total 
constitution‟, whereby the exercise of state power is steered in all its aspects towards 
rights-friendly goals.  These aspirations are reined in by the inherent indeterminacy of 
rights review, its inevitably limited impact and ultimately by its complex and 
contested relationship with popular sovereignty. However, perhaps ironically, these 
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limitations ultimately serve to lend strength to rights-based constitutionalism. By 
steering the exercise of state power towards giving effect to human rights, it places a 
considerable burden of justification on those who wish to push back against this 
direction of travel.  
 
Fred Vinson’s Heart and the Origins of the ‘Rights Revolution’ 
 
This paper could be subtitled „The Persisting Legacy of Fred Vinson‟s Heart and Its 
Implications for Constitutional Theory‟. When the seminal case of Brown v Board of 
Education of Topeka Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.
1
 reached the US Supreme Court 
in early 1952, the then Chief Justice, Fred Vinson, was concerned that a decision by 
the Court to find educational segregation in conflict with the Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14
th
 Amendment would be regarded as constituting an usurpation of the Court‟s 
limited constitutional role within the US system of separation of powers. However, 
the situation changed dramatically following Vinson‟s death from a sudden heart 
attack on September 8, 1953. The former Republican Governor of California and 
newly-appointed Chief Justice, Earl Warren, patiently won his colleagues around to 
the view that the time was ripe to reverse Plessy and declare segregation 
unconstitutional.
2
 Warren was so successful in his patient coalition-building that all 
his colleagues finally joined in the Chief Justice‟s opinion, and when the final 
decision in Brown emerged on May 17, 1954, it was the product of a unanimous 
court.
3
 
 
The subsequent impact of Brown has been the subject of sustained debate since 1952.
4
 
However, from the perspective of constitutional theory, the Brown judgment at first 
                                                 
1
 (1954) 347 U.S. 483. 
2
 The changing landscape of American politics can nicely be illustrated by considering the response of 
any attempt by a President to nominate a state governor to the Supreme Court, let alone the current 
Governor of California: it should be noted that Warren‟s nomination by President Eisenhower and 
subsequent appointment to the Court was largely uncontroversial, even if Eisenhower later was reputed 
to have described it as the „worst mistake‟ of his Presidency. See E. De Grazia, „Human Law and 
Humanistic Justice‟ (1988) 10 (1& 2) Cardozo Law Review 25-35, ftn. 6 
3
 (1954) 347 U.S. 483. 
4
 For a sample of the vast literature on Brown, see D. Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown Board of 
Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform (Oxford University Press, 2004); R. Kluger, 
Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality 
(revised ed.) (Knopf, 2004); C. J. Ogletree Jr., All Deliberate Speed: Reflections on the First Half 
Century of Brown v. Board of Education (Norton, 2004); D. Rhode & C. Ogletree (eds.), Brown at 50: 
The Unfinished Legacy (American Bar Association, 2004). Many scholars have questioned the extent 
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glance would appear to be of limited significance. The US Supreme Court had carved 
out a role for itself decades previously as a protector of individual rights, even if the 
laissez-faire libertarian jurisprudence of the Lochner years had become thoroughly 
discredited by 1937: insofar as Brown can be seen as a significant departure from 
existing constitutional practice, it appeared to many at the time (and also to many 
commentators today) to mark the re-emergence of a modified form of negative 
constitutionalism, of different substance perhaps to that of the Lochner years, but of 
similar formal properties when viewed as an element of an overall constitutional 
framework.
5
 Nevertheless, this analysis, while not wholly inaccurate, glosses over key 
elements of the „new constitutionalism‟ that has emerged in the wake of Brown, and 
of which it remains a potent symbol.  
 
To begin with, the Supreme Court‟s judgments in Brown and other early civil rights 
cases conferred new impetus to the idea of constitutionalism. Their fusion of the 
hitherto largely formalistic and libertarian negative rights protection established 
within the US constitutional architecture with wider normative engagement with 
contested, divisive and fundamental questions of social justice touched a nerve. In 
particular, they opened the door to the possibility that constitutional control 
mechanisms could be detached to some degree from its historic emphasis on 
libertarian counter-democratic controls: perhaps for the first time, the tools of liberal 
constitutionalism appeared capable of being put to some use in remedying gaps 
between the abstract constitutional promises of equality, justice and democracy and 
the reality of oppressive power structures.  
                                                                                                                                            
to which the decision actively contributed to ending segregation in the southern US states: in many 
ways, despite the Court‟s attempt to ensure the effective implementation of its judgment in Brown (No. 
2), the Court‟s judgment had at most limited impact in the educational sphere. Others have been critical 
of the common view that Brown represented a major step forward in the judicial protection of rights, 
suggesting that the Court‟s judgment merely reflected the emerging state of elite opinion and was 
influenced by the background of the by-then intense Cold War propaganda battle as to the comparative 
merits of the Western and Soviet systems: see e.g. M. Dudziak, „Desegregation as a Cold War 
Imperative‟ (1988) 41 Stanford L.R. 61. However, given the scale and intensity of the reaction in the 
southern states against the Court‟s decision, it is perhaps excessively revisionist to portray Brown as a 
passive confirmation of an emerging consensus. As many of the texts above so argue, Brown does 
appear to have had a substantial impact in beginning the process sof dismantling segregation.  
5
 Brown was not even the Court‟s first significant civil rights decision: in 1948, attempts by the Texas 
Democratic party to maintain a colour-bar had been overturned by the Court, while in the same year the 
Court in Shelley v Kraemer 334 U.S. 1 (1948) had refused to enforce racially restrictive covenants. 
Shelley is generally viewed as the furthest the US Supreme Court has been willing to go in giving 
horizontal effect to constitutional rights, although debate goes on the scope of constitutionally 
controlled „state action‟ : see S. Gardbaum, „The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights‟ (2003) 
102 Michigan Law Review 388-459. 
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In practice, Brown and its civil rights siblings had a limited if not insignificant effect 
in generating social change, as Mark Tushnet and others have noted.
6
 Nevertheless, 
they demonstrated how constitutionalism could through the use of self-reflexive 
interpretative techniques generate a framework of legal norms which was able to 
reflect and echo the emerging post-war policio-philosophical normative vocabulary of 
human rights, non-discrimination and equality. In addition, these cases opened up 
sufficient apertures within existing politico-legal power structures to make 
progressive legal activism a meaningful endeavour.
7
 Rawlings argues that the „classic 
functionalist question to the purveyor of elegant principles of habeas corpus should 
never be forgotten: “yes, but how many got out?”‟8 The answer that Brown and its 
siblings gave to the equivalent questions applicable to them was qualified, but 
sufficiently positive to open up new directions within the existing constitutionalist 
frameworks and to excite the enthusiasm of those pressing for social change.  
 
As a consequence, and in interesting contrast to the bulk of the US Supreme Court‟s 
jurisprudence over 200 years of existence, Brown has come to represent 
constitutionalism in its best light, marching hand-in-hand with best contemporary 
accounts of social justice to reinforce a deeper concept of democracy. In addition, 
Brown has both helped to trigger and become a symbolic marker of the dawning of 
what Charles Epp famously described as the „rights revolution‟,9 namely the shift in 
constitutional thinking that has generated the expectation that state constitutional 
frameworks at large should provide substantive and effective protection for what post-
1945 are described as „human rights‟.10 Constitutions serve multiple purposes, being 
                                                 
6
 See e.g. the excellent discussion in M. Tushnet, „Implementing, Transfomring, and Abandoning 
Brown‟, in D. Rhode & C. Ogletree (eds.), Brown at 50: The Unfinished Legacy (American Bar 
Association, 2004).  
7
 „Progressive legal activism‟ here is used in its widest and most abstract sense, to indicate the use of 
legal routes to generate some form of social change: it is not intended to exclude legal activism directed 
towards libertarian, socially conservative or other non-liberal/left political objectives, which within its 
own terms is striving for progressive change just as much as liberal/left activism, despite the latter‟s 
rhetorical claim to the language of „progress‟.    
8
 R. Rawlings, „Modelling Judicial Review‟ (2008) Current Legal Problems 140-185, 158. 
9
 C.R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective (University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
10
 I have used quotation marks here to emphasise the status of the current lexicon of human rights as 
the product of a particular historical process of development. 
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expected to discharge a range of symbolic, norm-generating and structural functions.
11
 
Within this array of expectations, the assumption that a constitution must speak of 
fundamental rights is now very strong: in particular, it is expected to both give 
symbolic recognition to rights and also generate legally-applicable norms that 
enhance individual and group protection against abuse of rights.
12
  
 
Brown and its civil rights siblings may have had relatively little influence on the 
emergence of this mutated constitutionalism in Europe and the decolonising wider 
world, notwithstanding the dominant intellectual influence exercised by US 
constitutionalism and US law schools over the last few decades and the importance of 
Brown within US constitutional narratives.
13
 However, at the very least, Brown has 
become a useful milestone to mark the point at which the „rights revolution‟ in 
constitutionalism took hold. In addition, it has become a touchstone which is regularly 
invoked by courts and commentators across the globe to justify the regularly-
expanding exercise of rights review through constitutionalist processes.
14
 As such, 
                                                 
11
 See J. Priban, „The Time of Constitution-Making: On the Differentiation of the Legal, Political and 
Moral Systems and Temporality of Constitutional Symbolism‟ (2006) 19(4) Ratio Juris 456-78: Prihan 
adopts a different classificatory approach than used above, choosing to distinguish between a 
constitution‟s symbolic, norm-imposing and normative functions.  
12
 In this context, the debate between Kelsen and Schmitt as to whether abstract constitutional norms 
could be given any credible substance as legal norms remains pointed: however, it has been sidelined 
by the acceptance within most constitutional systems of the legally binding status of the concrete 
interpretation given to abstract rights norms by constitutional courts, and in many cases as well by the 
interpretation of such norms adopted by regional and international  counterparts, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights. Whether courts, tribunals or ombudsmen are performing a purely legal role 
when they carry out this interpretative role may interest legal theorists, but this question appears to 
resonate much less outside the academy than debates as to whether a justifiable interpretation has been 
adopted in a specific given case, or whether the system of concrete norms which emerges from this 
interpretative process is legitimate when taken as a whole.  
13
 It is interesting to speculate whether the „Rights Revolution‟ would ever have swept contemporary 
constitutional design if a re-affirmation of Plessy had nipped civil rights litigation in the bud in 1953.  
In continental Europe, the emergence of rights review appears to have had its primary roots in the post-
war resurgence of natural law theory in the work of Radbruch, Maritain and others, combined with the 
residual memory of the pre-war examples of constitutional review to be found in Austrian 
constitutional law and the debates on the enforceability of the fundamental rights provisions of the 
Constitution of the Weimar Republic. (In this respect, it should be noted that the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights which make provision for the establishment of a human rights 
court predate Brown by four years.) Also, the emerging rhetoric of human rights as set out in the text of 
the Universal Declaration also played a role, both within Europe and across the wider world, as 
doubtless did the influence of the earlier US constitutional jurisprudence. As a result, the „Rights 
Revolution‟ may have taken place even if Brown and its siblings had been decided differently. 
However, it could be argued that at a minimum the scope and impact of the Brown decision and its 
civil rights siblings conferred impetus and even glamour on rights-based constitutionalism that it might 
otherwise lack.    
14
 The most interesting recent manifestation of this tendency to cite Brown in support of 
constitutionalist-style rights review can be found in the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3, where the Grand Chamber of the Court cited key 
 6 
this mutated rights-based constitutionalism can be seen at least in part as the bequest 
conferred by Fred Vinson‟s heart. 
 
This legacy appears to keep on giving. No recently drafted constitution is now 
complete without a resonant list of fundamental rights guarantees, while transnational 
quasi-constitutional systems such as the EU are often criticised as half-formed on the 
basis that they lack a convincing „rights dimension‟, resulting in the insertion of texts 
such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the generation via judicial 
creativity of legally-applicable rights norms via judgments such as those adopted by 
the European Court of Justice in Nold
15
 and Kadi.
16
 
 
The UK has recently succumbed to this trend, initially the common law 
constitutionalism of the 1990s and now more directly through the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA):
17
 significantly, recent Conservative proposals to replace the HRA have 
assumed that some form of judicial rights protection is desirable, and have been based 
on the assumption that a healthy constitutional system should say something about 
fundamental rights, even if only in the form of symbolic rhetoric.
18
 Similarly, Stone–
Sweet has traced how rights review has become a crucial vector for the expansion of 
judicialisation and constitutional controls throughout Western Europe.
19
 The recent 
                                                                                                                                            
passages in Brown to support its conclusion that the Czech educational system was discriminating 
against Roma children by effectively segregating tem in special needs schools. The reference to Brown 
here is not just explicable by the similar subject matter in both cases: it is apparent from the context and 
wording of the judgment in DH that the Grand Chamber was consciously citing Brown to support and 
bolster its decision to deepen and extend the reach of its existing anti-discrimination case-law, 
notwithstanding objections from dissenting judges that in so doing it was uncritically adopting an 
„Anglo-Saxon‟ jurisprudence alien to continental European legal traditions.   
15
 Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission [1975] E.C.R. 985; [1974] E.C.R. 491; [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 338: see 
also Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] E.C.R. 419; [1970] C.M.L.R. 112; Case 44/79, Hauer v. 
Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] E.C.R. 3727; [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42. 
16
 Kadi v Council of the European Union (Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P) [2008] 3 
CMLR 1207, ECJ. 
17
 For an empirical analysis of the impact of the HRA on the work-load of the UK House of Lords, see 
T. Poole and S. Shah, 'The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords' (2009) Public Law, 
Apr, 347-371. 
18
 See the outline of Conservative proposals for a Bill of Rights for the UK by Dominic Grieve M.P., 
„Can The Bill Of Rights Do Better Than The Human Rights Act?‟, 30 November 2009, available at 
http://www.dominicgrieve.org.uk/record.jsp?type=speech&ID=82. Note also the similar assumptions 
underpinning Labour and Liberal Democrat proposals for a Bill of Rights: see in general, C. 
O‟Cinneide, The New Human Rights Culture‟, in R. Hazel and M. Glover (eds.) Constitutional Futures 
Revisited (London: Palgrave, 2008), 159-177. 
19
 See e.g. A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford: OUP, 
2000). 
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French constitutional reforms could be seen as exemplifying this tendency.
 20
 Even the 
Nordic countries, hitherto relatively immune to the enthusiasm for rights review that 
has swept most legal systems, are showing some signs of following the trend.
21
  
 
The progress of the „Rights Revolution is even more pronounced outside the slower-
moving (arthritic?) European constitutional systems. The manner in which the South 
African Constitutional Court was not alone given responsibility to adjudicate on 
issues of socio-economic rights and the death penalty, but also asked to comment on 
the validity of the Interim Constitution of 1994 from inter alia a fundamental rights 
perspective, is striking. The assumption of sweeping constitutional powers by the 
Indian Supreme Court post-Emergency in the name of fundamental rights is also 
noteworthy, while recent developments in Latin America make the South African 
experiment look tame: the recent reform of the Ecuadorian Constitution confers courts 
with powers to enforce a wide range of fundamental rights and principles, including 
concepts of biodiversity, while the Brazilian Constitution recognises more than 80 
judicially enforceable rights, whose numbers have recently been added to by the 
insertion of a right to food. Within the group of states recognised as „democratic‟ 
within a broad meaning of that term, Australia alone remains largely immune to the 
charms of the „Rights Revolution‟, with the exception of the introduction in Victoria 
and the ACT of state charters of rights.  
 
Post-Brown Rights Constitutionalism – A Mutant Strand 
 
This sweeping embrace of rights-based constitutionalism has happened 
notwithstanding considerable academic scepticism. It has also caught fire despite the 
reasonably miserable record of this form of constitutionalism in the United States, 
where the well-meaning liberal activism of the Warren and Burger Supreme Courts 
                                                 
20
 The perceived incompleteness of the existing French constitutional system stemming from the 
absence of a posterior constitutional review has been remedied by the grant of jurisdiction to the 
Conseil constitutionnel to assess the constitutionality of enacted laws. This expansion of the Conseil‟s 
role goes beyond rights review, but many commentators have noted that the primary impact of this 
constitutional reform will be felt in the sphere of individual rights, not least when it comes to the 
relationship between the scope and content of rights recognised within the French constitutional order 
and those protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. See M. Hunter-Henin, „Additional 
Constitutional Review for France: A valuable addition to human rights protection?‟, paper on file with 
the author, 10 June 2010. 
21
 The partial judicialisation of socio-economic rights in Finland represents an example of this: see 
Section 15 A of the Constitution Act of Finland 1995. 
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recedes into distant memory. It remains to be seen whether enthusiasm will abate, and 
be replaced with a new focus on the possibilities inherent in popular constituent 
power, as has occurred in US academic and political circles.
22
 However, at present, 
the post-Brown infiltration of rights into the mainstream of constitutionalism has 
become perhaps the pre-eminent trend of our current constitutional era. If, to 
paraphrase Martin Loughlin, constitutions establish the „architecture‟ or structural 
framework through which state power is exercised,
23
 then contemporary constitutions 
are now in the post-Brown era increasingly expected to shape and steer the exercise of 
state power in a manner that ensures that it accords with legal norms which in turn 
echo the language of rights.  
 
In general, there are various reasons to explain the popularity of the mutated form of 
constitutionalism represented by Brown. In advanced capitalist societies with ever-
increasing differentiation, technocratic determinism, population mixing and eroded 
communal bonds, rights-based constitutionalism appears to provide a super-regulatory 
framework that is sufficiently open-ended, malleable and abstract to be applied across 
a wide range of social interaction: it also draws upon a relatively deep well of 
legitimacy because of its link to the normative human rights framework, which 
remains the nearest thing in contemporary discourse to a shared „civic religion‟. In 
addition, the exercise of the constituent power or even constituted electoral power by 
popular majorities as a vehicle for achieving social change has become severely 
attenuated since its heyday in Western states from 1870 to 1960: as electoral choice 
becomes increasingly hemmed in by the pressures exerted by competitive market 
forces, shifting patterns of global economic and political power and the inescapable 
demands of trans-national co-operation, alternative methods of governance inevitably 
appear comparatively more attractive for those seeking to steer the power of the state 
in what they consider to be a desirable direction.
24
 Other reasons may exist for the 
impressive sweep of the „rights revolution‟: however, it is apparent that much of its 
                                                 
22
 See e.g. the analysis in M. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton 
University Press, 1999).  
23
 'M. Loughlin, Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay'‟ (2005) 25 O.J.L.S. 183 
24
 This is not to deny the continuing importance of national constitutional frameworks, and indeed the 
importance of a constitutional science that maintains a focus on the nature of the state. Loughlin‟s 
criticism of an excessive emphasis on multi-level constitutionalism at the expense of Staatslehre is well 
made: M. Loughlin, „In Defence of Staatslehre‟ (2009) 48(1) Der Staat (Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblot) pp. 1-28. 
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appeal lies in the moral charge given to constitutionalism by its linkage in Brown and 
elsewhere to the potent rhetoric of human rights and equality. This gave it an 
apparently transformative dimension that other forms of power-steering mechanisms 
lack.  
 
As a result, the mutated form of constitutionalism represented by the „Rights 
Revolution‟ can be seen as representing the first element of the legacy bestowed by 
Fred Vinson‟s heart. While it resembles in formal terms the constitutionalism of 
Guizot, Mill and De Tocqueville (not to mention Wednesbury and Fair Fares) and its 
substantive concerns and the scope of its vaulting ambition differ greatly. 
Constitutionalism has partially mutated into a new and more potent form, whereby 
controls on the exercise of constituted power are shaped not just by the formal 
demands of separation of powers and ultra vries doctrines, but also now by a range of 
normative concepts linked to often inchoate but far-reaching human rights values. 
Aspirations of achieving some form of social justice, of creating a farer and better 
society, are now part of the mission statement, whereas classic constitutionalism was 
arguably more concerned with the limited objective of restraining the abuse of state 
power. What is expected of constitutionalism has expanded, even while alternative 
power-steering mechanisms have begun to stall. This is not to say that classic 
constitutionalism has disappeared: it remains vigorous and potent. However, a new 
dimension has been attached via the sweep of the „rights revolution‟, which can both 
complement and come into conflict with the classic variant.   
 
The Relationship with Negative Constitutionalism and the Exercise of State Power 
 
This legacy has some very ambiguous elements. The mutated form of 
constitutionalism represented by Brown is usually exercised through the conventional 
channels of pre-established constitutionalism, and often overlaps with more classical 
elements.
25
 In addition, its primary focus is on the control and steering of state power. 
As a consequence, it is often analysed in constitutional theory as a form of „negative 
constitutionalism‟, i.e. focused on limiting state power, to be contrasted with „positive 
constitutionalism‟, i.e. the elements of constitutionalism that help to ensure the ability 
                                                 
25
 Significant exceptions exist, in particular in India with its tradition of public interest litigation. 
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of the state to make effective use of its constituted power.
26
 This means that rights 
review is often conceptualised (at least in Anglo-American liberal constitutional 
theory) as a form of power-blocking mechanism, umbilically linked to mainstream 
classical liberal constitutional theory and sharing its concern to protect the individual 
against the excessive and unfair exercise of state authority.  
 
This assumption is clearly present in the writing of legal theorists closely associated 
with the „rights revolution‟. For example, Dworkin conceptualises legal rights as 
protecting individuals against unjustified state interference through „reason blocking‟ 
analysis.
27
 Indeed, a host of commentators adopting Dworkinian or Rawlsian 
positions have offered accounts of rights-based constitutionalism that emphasise the 
protective shield it throws around individuals, which march in step with the 
presuppositions of classical liberal „negative‟ constitutionalism.  
 
Within these analytical frameworks, the central focus is on the role of the courts in 
protecting individuals against external interference. Rights are conceptualised as a 
form of immunity, which when applied by courts insulated against the tidal surges of 
democratic contestation serves to protect the „negative liberty‟ of individuals against 
the power of the state. In contrast, aspects of the emerging rights jurisprudence of 
national and international courts that deviate from this model, such as the 
development of the concept of positive obligations, the extension of the horizontal 
effect of rights or the protection of socio-economic entitlements, tend to be 
marginalised: as they constitute deviations from the standard template of negative 
constitutionalism involving the extension or active directing of state power to achieve 
definite ends, these aspects of the post-Brown constitutionalism sit uncomfortably 
with the classic template.
28
  
 
Tim Macklem, for example, has argued that the negative protection of rights by courts 
acting to block state action is intrinsically more legitimate and less concerning from 
the point of view of the counter-majoritarian difficulty than when courts act to impose 
                                                 
26
 Note the excellent analysis of negative and positive constitutionalism in S. Holmes, Passions and 
Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) 
27
 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978). 
28
 See e.g. the analysis in G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (OUP, 2007). 
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positive obligations upon the state.
29
 This presumes that the imposition of negative 
constraints upon state action is clearly distinguishable from the imposition of positive 
obligations, an assumption which is unsustainable when one considers, for example, 
the positive role of the state in providing the essentials of a fair trial. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis placed by Macklem on the negative/positive distinction despite twenty years 
of human rights scholarship calling the distinction into question shows the persisting 
force in liberal jurisprudential analysis of the assumption that rights review is and can 
be essentially only concerned with immunities.  
 
Commentators who adopt a more sceptical approach towards the post-Brown 
constitutionalism also tend to analyse it in terms of negative constitutionalism. Thus, 
Martin Loughlin in his work tends to treat rights review as a form of negative 
constraint upon the state which is largely predicated upon a stance of distrust towards 
the exercise of sate power. He echoes Schmitt and others in critiquing the inability of 
negative constitutionalism at large to engage adequately with the constituent power of 
a self-governing people, and views it as contaminated by the tendency of much liberal 
constitutionalism to assume the existence of shared communal norms whose contents 
can be defined by a jurisprudential „priesthood‟ of philosophers and „Herculean‟ 
judges.
30
 Similar views have been adopted by other „rights sceptics‟, who often 
emphasise the power-constraining focus and counter-democratic bias of post-Brown 
rights-based constitutionalism.
31
 
 
Rights protection therefore is often viewed as perhaps the ultimate embodiment of 
power-constraining „negative constitutionalism‟, by both enthusiasts and sceptics 
alike. However, when one examines how rights are conceptualised and protected in 
constitutional practice, a more variegated picture emerges. To begin with, the role in 
practice played by constitutional courts in protecting rights is often different than is 
suggested by the metaphor of „blocking‟ state action. Courts may restrict, divert or re-
direct the legal avenues through which state power is exercised, but rarely completely 
dam its flow. Governments may be forced by the exercise of rights review by courts 
into using alternative and less convenient legal routes to achieve their aims, or may 
                                                 
29
 T. Macklem, „Entrenching Bills of Rights‟ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 107. 
30
 M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2004), at p. xxx. 
31
 See the essays in T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing and A. Tomkins, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights 
(Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
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even be forced into attempting to make use of the available forms of political override 
that are available within the relevant constitutional system such as referendum 
procedures, court-packing or super-majority amendment. However, rights-based 
constitutionalism, despite many of the claims made by both its supporters and its 
critics, tends to result in the redirection or deflection of state power, not its paralysis.
32
  
 
Furthermore, the relationship between the exercise of state power and the manner in 
which constitutional rights are protected in constitutional systems is also more 
complex than a „negative constitutionalist‟ analysis suggests. The constitutional rights 
jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court is still at least in theory built around the 
concept of rights serving as immunities to protect individual freedom against the 
illegitimate exercise of state power. However, the approach adopted in the 
fundamental rights jurisprudence of European courts (including the quasi-
constitutional ECHR and EU frameworks), as well as in the Canadian and South 
African courts, is much closer to the ‟balancing‟ analysis developed by Robert Alexy, 
or the „priorisation‟ approach described by Steven Greer.33 In other words, rights tend 
by and large to be treated as norms which should receive suitable priorisation in how 
state power is exercised, whose application is balanced against other legitimate public 
interest considerations by means of overt or occasionally hidden forms of 
proportionality analysis carried out by courts within the (flexible) parameters of legal 
reasoning.
34
 Individual rights are not conceptualised as „trumps‟, whose infinite value 
outweighs alternative goals of state activity, but rather as forces of attraction which 
should influence and guide the trajectory of state action unless it has sufficient 
justificatory force to escape their orbit.
35
 
                                                 
32
 See C. O‟Cinneide, „Democracy and Rights: New Directions in the Human Rights Era‟ [2004] 57 
Current Legal Problems 175-211. The much-abused concept of „constitutional dialogue‟ is often 
wheeled out to try and capture this element of rights review: however, is problematic in many respects, 
not least because it soft-soaps the reality that rights review is conflictual in nature. 
33
 S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006); S. Greer, „"Balancing" and the European Court of Human Rights: 
A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate‟ (2004) Cambridge Law Journal 412-434. 
34
 Stone-Sweet and Mathews argue that proportionality analysis has „emerged as a multi-purpose, best-
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As a result, rights protection in constitutional systems at least is best conceptualised 
not as involving the restriction or nullification of state power in the name of 
individual liberty, but rather as a mechanism that attempts to steer or orientate the 
exercise of state power in what is deemed to be a rights-friendly direction. The shift 
this represents from the immunities approach often generates some discomfort 
amongst commentators wedded to Dworkinian liberal philosophy, as it appears to 
abandon the idea of „right as trumps‟ and pull individual rights down into the mud of 
balancing analysis.
36
 However, it avoids the conceptual dichotomy between collective 
and individual well-being which underpins the immunity analysis: proportionality and 
balancing approaches are better able to recognise and accommodate the value of 
collective state action.
37
  
 
Janus-faced Constitutionalism 
 
In addition, post-Brown constitutionalism is increasingly comfortable with deploying 
state power to achieve its goals of protecting individual rights even where the threat 
stems from private actors or from state inaction. Under the influence of international 
human rights law, which tends to be much less tied to a negative focus on state action 
than many national constitutional systems, rights review now is increasingly 
accommodating of the concept of state „positive obligations‟. These have mainly 
emerged in the context of right to life obligations under the ECHR system, but the 
concept of positive obligations have been stretched to encompass a potentially broad 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence in India and Latin America. Similarly, national 
constitutional systems are increasingly giving horizontal effect to rights guarantees, 
and requiring private law to conform to objective constitutional norms in line with the 
German Drittwirkung approach.  
 
This reflects the reality that attempting to deliver on the aims, ideals and ambitions of 
the post-Brown constitutionalism can require national constitutional systems to go 
                                                                                                                                            
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss papers/30 (last accessed 20th June 2010). 
36
 See Letsas, above at n. 28.  
37
 Theories of balancing are open to criticism as being difficult to reconcile with kep elements of the 
human rights normative architecture: see B. Cali, „Balancing Human Rights? Methodological Problems 
with Weights, Scales and Proportions‟ 29(1) Human Rights Quarterly 251-270. 
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beyond the classical limits of negative constitutionalism and embrace state power as a 
crucial instrument for implementing rights guarantees. Even in the United States, with 
its continuing strong attachment to the rights as immunities approach, this tendency is 
notable, especially at state level as evidenced by the education rights jurisprudence of 
the New York and Massachusetts Supreme Courts. The fall-out from Brown also 
neatly illustrates this „pull‟ effect: the ineffectiveness of the Supreme Court‟s initial 
tentative order for its decision to be implemented „with all deliberate speed‟ generated 
pressure for the Court to beef up its response, a process which ultimately took the US 
federal courts into the terrain of school re-districting and compulsory bussing 
schemes. Similarly, combating segregation took the Court‟s Equal Protection 
jurisprudence further into the private sphere than any other aspect of US constitutional 
law.
38
      
 
As such, a notable characteristic of the post-Brown constitutionalism has been the 
way it which it combines elements of classical negative constitutionalism with the 
periodic embrace of state power where necessary to deliver on its professed 
ambitions.
39
 Constitutional rights jurisprudence therefore increasingly adopts a 
„negative‟ and a „positive‟ face: elements of both negative and positive 
constitutionalism (the latter understood in a broad sense as concerned with enabling 
the effective exercise of state power) are combined in what can be described as a 
„Janus-faced constitutionalism‟, which both draws upon negative constitutionalism 
and embraces state action.  
 
As a consequence, analysing post-Brown rights-based constitutionalism in terms of 
the classical dichotomy between negative and positive constitutionalism can be 
seriously misleading. Accounts of rights review that emphasise its immunity-
conferring functions distort the manner in which it increasingly embraces the role of 
the state as the prime agent for ensuring meaningful enjoyment of rights: state power 
is not conceived as the enemy against which protection is required, but rather as a 
                                                 
38
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39
 In addition, it also at times acts to enable state action, with judicial interpretation of fundamental 
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tempestuous animal which must be steered towards the proper path before being given 
its head.  
 
The ‘Total Constitution’ 
 
This is not to underestimate the manner in which rights-based constitutionalism and 
classical negative constitutionalism run on parallel tracks, which is especially the case 
when expression, liberty and fair trial rights are at issue. However, its Janus-faced 
straddling of negative and positive stances towards the exercise of state power should 
be seen as a distinct type of constitutionalism. In its ambition to deliver social justice 
through the specific conceptual framework of human rights, it is best seen not as 
aspiring towards the control of a limited state, as per the aspirations of classical 
constitutionalism, but rather towards an end state similar to what Mattias Kamm has 
described as a „total constitution‟, where the exercise of state power in all its 
regulatory and social control modes should both respect and be directed towards 
giving full effect to certain human rights norms.
40
  
 
Kamm suggests that this form of constitutionalism is a „kind of juridical genome that 
contains the DNA for the development of the whole legal system. It establishes a 
general normative program for choices to be made by public authorities vis à vis 
individuals.‟41 This definition acts as a neat encapsulation of the vaulting ambition of 
the post-Brown rights constitutionalism, except for one significant qualifier: the 
phrase „total constitution‟ is misleading insofar as it implies that post-Brown rights 
constitutionalism occupies the complete constitutional imagination of countries which 
have embraced it. (This is why the metaphor of the „Janus face‟ perhaps works better.) 
In reality, as already emphasised, post-Brown mutated constitutionalism has not 
supplanted the more classical negative strains of constitutionalism that remain 
embedded to varying degrees in national constitutional systems.  
 
                                                 
40
 M. Kamm, „Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the 
Constitutionalization of Private Law‟ (2006) 7(4) German Law Journal 341-69. 
41
 Ibid., 344. Kamm at 343 contrasts this „total constitution‟ with Schmitt‟s „total state‟, and suggests 
that if a total state is one in which „everything is up for grabs politically, a total constitution inverts the 
relationship between law and politics…If in the total state law is conceived as the continuation of 
politics by other means, under the total constitution politics is conceived as the continuation of law by 
other means.‟ (Author‟s italics removed.) 
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Thus, for example, in European and North American systems, it is intermixed with 
other constitutionalist elements, both negative and positive. These elements often co-
exist in a tense relationship, as illustrated by the persistent arguments made within UK 
constitutional debate that the Human Rights Act remains an alien transplant in the 
UK‟s constitutional landscape, dominated as it is still by its unique historical mix of 
very distinctive negative and positive constitutionalisms. These tensions can manifest 
themselves in the evolution of human rights case-law:  note for example the tangible 
reluctance of the majority of the UK House of Lords in YL v Birmingham City 
Council to treat private care homes as „public authorities‟ for the purposes of s. 6 
HRA and therefore to expose private companies directly to the public law demands of 
the ECHR.
42
 At times, clear choices are made as to the presumptive priority of these 
different strands when they come into conflict: in the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County,
43
 the US Supreme Court clearly indicated its preference for an approach 
primarily rooted in negative constitutionalism,
44
 while in contrast the 
Bundesversfassungsgericht could be seen to have in the Mephisto case to have 
embraced dual-facing constitutionalism.
45
 Nor is this tension confined to national 
contexts: within the quasi-constitutional system of EU law, interesting tensions arise 
between the strand of rights DNA represented by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the mainstream free movement and economic integrationist DNA of EU 
constitutionalism.  
 
Rights-based constitutionalism perhaps finds its widest expression (and comes closer 
to serving as a „total constitution‟) in the recent „transformative‟ rights jurisprudence 
of the Latin American, South African and Indian constitutional systems, which in the 
name of redressing a tainted colonial past aim to orientate the exercise of state power 
across almost the full spectrum of public functions towards giving substantive effect 
to a multi-faceted and extensive catalogue of rights.
46
 (An interesting argument could 
                                                 
42
 [2008] 1 AC 153. 
43
 DeShaney v. Winnebago County 489 U.S. 189 
44
 For an interesting if optimistic argument that the US constitutional landscape contains all the 
ingredients to cultivate a European-style rights constitutionalism, see S. Gardbaum, „The Myth and the 
Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism‟ (2008) 107 Michigan L. Rev. 391. 
45
 BVerfGE 30, 173. 
46
 For discussion of the „transformative‟ dimension of the South African constitutional order, see Karl 
Klare, „Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism‟ (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 146; Dikgang Moseneke, „Transformative Adjudication‟ (2002) 18 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 309; and Pius Langa, „The Vision of the Constitution‟ (2003) 120 South 
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be made that Germany could also be classified as a „transformative‟ system.) In these 
jurisdictions, and in particular in the emerging „super-democracies‟ of India and 
Brazil, the vaulting ambition of post-Brown constitutionalism becomes apparent, 
perhaps no better evidenced then by the recent decisions of the Indian Supreme Court 
requiring the state to provide free school meals for millions of school-children.
47
   
 
The Limits of Post-Brown Rights Constitutionalism 
 
However, some of this jurisprudence also illustrates the difficulties that lie latent 
within the „Janus-faced‟ post-Brown constitutionalism. Indian judicial activism has 
waxed and waned, and taken disparate and often unpredictable forms.
48
 Octavio 
Ferraz has been very critical of the over-reach of the right to health jurisprudence of 
the Brazilian judiciary.
49
 Closer to home, the sure touch of the European Court of 
Human Rights and its impressive jurisprudence over the last few decades has recently 
been overshadowed by its unconvincing intervention in Lautsi v Italy into church-
state relations in Italy in the name of a completely underdeveloped notion of a right to 
a secular educational environment.
50
  
 
The problems with such judgments lie deeper than mere judicial fallibility. They 
relate to the vaulting ambition of post-Brown rights constitutionalism and the 
difficulties it faces in defining what exactly is required to ensure full and effective 
enjoyment of often open-ended rights guarantees. For all its narrowness of focus and 
hostile stance towards the collective dimension to state action, the „immunities‟ 
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approach around which negative constitutionalism is built can at least rely on the 
tropes of liberal individualist philosophy to define its scope and reach. Post-Brown 
rights constitutionalism and the international human rights framework on which it 
draws is underpinned by a wide vision of human flourishing: however, it also 
consequentially lacks a clear sense of its limits, and how far it must go in giving effect 
to this vision. In aspiring to the state of a „total constitution‟, it often lacks a clear 
sense of the direction in which it should steer the exercise of state power, and of the 
relationship between rights and other forms of social goods.  
 
Its aspirations towards full and effective protection, and the promise it holds out of 
making constitutionalism an effective tool for achieving comprehensive social justice, 
also ensure that post-Brown rights constitutionalism often offers more than it can 
deliver. It generates the expectation that a comprehensively just legal and political 
order will come into being through the guiding influence of constitutional norms. 
However, legal norms in general lack the capacity to deliver on this promise, being 
tied to particular forms of procedure and redress that cannot begin to engage with 
many generative factors for social inequality and injustice. As systems theory makes 
clear, law can only speak eloquently within its own self-contained functional 
frameworks, and can only speak coherently of things it can articulate within its own 
tongue:
51
 despite the post-Brown promise, social justice and constitutionalism are not 
easy to fuse. 
 
As a consequence, constitutional rights norms as they have evolved in national legal 
systems are often either too narrow in their scope to deliver on the promise of 
comprehensive justice, or else if interpreted too widely can cut across alternative 
accounts of justice and thereby may disappoint or enrage as much as they deliver. In 
addition, post-Brown constitutionalism can slip into technocratic instrumentalism, just 
like any other governing technologies, and also lacks the capacity to begin to engage 
with the deep economic and political currents that shape our lives. Therefore, in an era 
dominated by rejuvenated ordo-liberalism and global neo-liberalism,
52
 post-Brown 
rights constitutionalism may at best ameliorate some of the excesses of the dominant 
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trajectory of state action, and at worse may fit nicely and unchallengingly into the 
governance modes of the state.  
 
Rights Review and Popular Sovereignty 
 
Post-Brown constitutionalism therefore aims to steer the exercise of state power, but 
runs the risk of falling foul of either or both the temptations of usurpation or 
abdication. It also remains embedded in an uncomfortable and contested relationship 
with popular sovereignty and the constituent power vested in the people by 
democratic theory: reliance is placed on top-down judicial control to steer the exercise 
of state power towards it desired ends, while simultaneously one of those desired ends 
is full, equal and non-hierarchal participation by all in the navigation of the ship of 
state.  
 
Various theoretical frameworks offer ways of re-conceptualising this relationship, 
ranging from Habermas‟s comprehensive discourse-based theories of deliberative 
democracy to Ely‟s case-law focused approach. However, the tension between rights 
review and popular sovereignty is ultimately an expression of the dichotomy between 
the constituent and constituted powers, or constitutionalism at large and democratic 
self-governance, which De Tocqueville analysed as integral to the merging 
democratic state of the 19
th
 century and which shows no sign soon of dissipating.  
 
In fact, as Tom Hickman has noted,
53
 the relationship between the principle of 
democratic self-governance and post-Brown rights constitutionalism can be seen as 
embodying the fundamental tensions that run through constitutional systems which 
Loughlin has identified by reference to the distinction made in the work of Michael 
Oakeshott between two modes of association, societas and universitas.
54
 Societas is a 
mode of group association with rules of governance that do not prescribe any 
particular purpose or goal for the group‟s activity. In contrast, universitas describes a 
contrasting mode of association where a group comes together to pursue distinct and 
fixed common ends. As Loughlin notes, the manner in which these modes interact is 
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generative of much of national public law, and the tensions that surround rights 
review are no different.  
 
Post-Brown constitutionalism is predicated on the concept that human rights 
constitute end-point goals which collective social activity through the state should be 
directed towards achieving, and thus can be seen as orientated towards the mode of 
universitas. In contrast, democratic sovereignty can be seen as orientated towards 
societas, in the sense that it is founded on the assumption that a sovereign people are 
free via representative procedures and referenda to adjust and alter the course of the 
ship of state, and are not confined to a particular set of co-ordinates.  
 
As such, even as rights review aims at the end-point of a „total constitution‟, it cuts 
across the Rousseauian principle that the sovereign popular will should remain free to 
fix and if necessary alter the trajectory of the state. In certain constitutional systems, 
this tension will not present particular problems, especially where the exercise of 
comprehensive rights review is clearly rooted in democratic consent: this can be 
argued to be clearly the case in Brazil, for example, and South Africa, and it is no 
coincidence that judicial activism tends to flourish in such systems. In other states, the 
tension remains a source of constant irritation, and rights review, whether by 
constitutional courts or even by international courts such as the ECrtHR, has to 
constantly earn its keep under the looming shadow of the often endlessly-deferred but 
nevertheless potent possibility of the overriding exercise of the popular will. 
  
The Persisting Attraction of Post-Brown Rights Constitutionalism 
 
Post-Brown rights constitutionalism therefore is confronted by a yawning gap 
between its ambitions and the more troubling reality both of its potential impact and 
its place within constitutional frameworks. However, these weaknesses show no sign 
of lessening the rolling-out of the Rights Revolution, or the vigour of this mutated 
form of constitutionalism.  
 
Its impact may be largely confined to legal terrain: however, the expectation that law 
will be just is very potent, and rights-based constitutionalism offers a route to 
constantly re-work and challenge existing law so as to create the conditions for the 
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establishment of a more just framework of legal norms, which other forms of 
constitutionalism struggle at present to achieve. This in turn creates enough apertures 
in the fabric of existing political and socio-economic conditions to ensure that rights 
review can partially deliver on its promise to link legal governance with social justice. 
As a result, despite disappointments and mixed outcomes, its appeal remains strong. 
 
The uncertain normative aims of rights review may even work in its favour: its link 
with the constantly-developing human rights normative framework ensures it 
possesses a mutability that allows it to adjust to changing values with relative speed, 
as evidenced by the rapid expansion of gay equality rights within both national and 
international human rights law. Its ability to adopt a Janus-faced stance towards the 
exercise of state power also strengthens its impact: unlike classical negative 
constitutionalism, its willingness to weave the necessity of state action into its 
approach means that it may succeed in avoiding the trap of attempting to tilt the 
balance too far between individualism and collectivism.      
 
In addition, the matter in which post-Brown constitutionalism attempts to steer state 
action towards rights-friendly goals ensures that it retains a strong appeal, 
notwithstanding its difficult relationship with popular sovereignty. So long as human 
rights continue to dominate the value landscape of western democracies, rights review 
will inevitably be seen as a useful tool to orientate state activity, and attempts by 
politicians and pressure groups to push back against well-reasoned and normatively 
sound court decisions on fundamental rights will remain a difficult task. The shadow 
of popular sovereignty also can help to ensure that the exercise of rights review is 
undertaken with a degree of necessary prudence, an essential virtue given its inherent 
tendency towards open-ended rights absolutism and judicial imperialism. In this way, 
the constraints on the „total constitution‟ ambitions of rights review help to shape its 
appeal and potency: in forcing it to constantly work to earn and retain its 
constitutional place, post-Brown constitutionalism is often steered away from its own 
inherent flaws.   
 
Conclusion 
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Taken these factors together, it becomes apparent that the mutated form of rights-
based constitutionalism that has emerged post-Brown differs in important respects in 
substance from classical negative constitutionalism. Through its Janus-faced stance 
towards state power, it adopts a different analysis of the relationship between the 
individual and the state, and in so doing aspires towards a form of „total constitution‟. 
However, these aspirations are reined in by its potential for indeterminacy, its limited 
impact and ultimately by its complex relationship with popular sovereignty. Perhaps 
ironically, these limitations may serve at times to lend strength to rights review. 
 
The problematic nature of post-Brown constitutionalism is obvious when one 
considers the apparent difference that the death of Fred Vinson made in 1953. Insofar 
as Brown played a role in helping to launch the „Rights Revolution‟, it is unsettling 
that so much may have been contingent on the health of a single US judge. The 
inability of rights-based constitutionalism by itself to change the world is also 
illustrated by Brown‟s mixed impact. However, Brown helped to change the 
landscape of constitutionalism, and given current conditions it is very difficult to 
envisage the genie of rights-based constitutionalism being put back into the bottle. It 
is too late to restart Fred Vinson‟s heart, even if we wished to do so: today, we live 
with its legacy.         
  
 
